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REVIEW CURRENTOPINION Neurobiology of functional (psychogenic)
movement disorderswww.co-neurology.coma b ´ aMark J. Edwards , Aikaterini Fotopoulou , and Isabel PareesPurpose of review
This review explores recent developments in understanding the neurobiological mechanism of
functional (psychogenic) movement disorders (FMDs). This is particularly relevant given the resurgence
of academic and clinical interest in patients with functional neurological symptoms and the clear
shift in diagnostic and treatment approaches away from a pure psychological model of functional
symptoms.
Recent findings
Recent research findings implicate three key processes in the neurobiology of FMD (and by extension other
functional neurological symptoms): abnormal attentional focus, abnormal beliefs and expectations, and
abnormalities in sense of agency. These three processes have been combined in recent neurobiological
models of FMD in which abnormal predictions related to movement are triggered by self-focused attention,
and the resulting movement is generated without the normal sense of agency that accompanies voluntary
movement.
Summary
New understanding of the neurobiology of FMD forms an important part of reappraising the way that
patients with FMD (and other functional disorders) are characterized and treated. It also provides a testable
framework for further exploring the pathophysiology of these common causes of ill health.
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nition of the disorder under discussion. This
presents some difficulties with the topic of this
article: functional (psychogenic) movement dis-
orders (FMDs). A common definition is that these
are movement disorders presumed to be due to
psychological factors or psychiatric illness and not
structural or neurochemical disease [1]. There are
difficulties with this definition however. First, the
dichotomy between structural/neurochemical dis-
ease and psychological factors/psychiatric illness
suggests a compartmentalized brain and mind: a
concept not supported by centuries of scientific
research. Second, the presumed psychological or
psychiatric factors in FMD are not apparent inmany
patients [2,3], are present in many people without
FMD, are not used by neurologists in the diagnosis
[4], and have even been rejected by psychiatrists as a
necessary diagnostic criterion in the equivalent psy-
chiatric diagnosis, conversion disorder [5]. As we
have argued previously [6], we prefer to define this
disorder on the basis of its clinical appearance as adistraction or nonphysiological manoeuvres
(including dramatic placebo response) and which
is clinically incongruent with movement disorders
known to be caused by neurological disease.FROM CLINICAL CHARACTERIZATION TO
MECHANISM
One of the key developments in recent years in FMD
has been the refinement of diagnostic criteria toVolume 26  Number 4  August 2013
KEY POINTS
 Clinically, patients with FMDs have symptoms that are
characterized by abnormal self-directed attention,
abnormal predictions/expectations related to
symptoms, and abnormal sense of agency.
 Experimental evidence now exists that supports the
hypothesis that there are abnormalities in attentional
focus related to movement, ‘priors’ within a predictive
coding framework of brain function, and processes
thought to index sense of agency.
 New neurobiological models of symptom production
have been generated from this evidence, which are
likely to generalize to other functional
neurological symptoms.
 Such models, although not excluding an important role
for psychological factors in symptom development and
treatment, mark a shift in characterization of patients
with FMDs, which has important implications
for management.
Neurobiology of functional movement disorders Edwards et al.focus more on positive physical signs and investi-
gation findings to support the diagnosis, rather than
the presence of psychological distress [7–9]. This is
one of the most important reasons why patients
with FMD (and those with functional weakness)
are such an importantmodel for studying the neuro-
biology of functional neurological symptoms in
general. In contrast to patients with symptoms such
as sensory loss, pain, fatigue and memory disturb-
ance, patients with FMD have objective motor signs
that are amenable to clinical and experimental
measurement. Diagnosis can therefore be positive
in many patients, relying on important clinical
differences in the way the movement disorder
changes with physical examination manoeuvres,
and provides a degree of certainty about the diag-
nosis, which may not be achievable in those whose
symptoms are only measurable via self-report. From
an experimental perspective, FMD can be objec-
tively measured (e.g., using an accelerometer to
measure tremor, using electromyography to
measure reaction time or pattern of muscle recruit-
ment), providing an objective parameter for exper-
imental studies. Perhaps most importantly, the
manner in which FMDs differ from typical ‘organic’
movement disorders both constrains and informs
neurobiological models for symptom generation.
Given the common co-occurrence of different func-
tional neurological symptoms in the same patients,
study of the neurobiology of FMD is likely to be
directly relevant to the neurobiology of all func-
tional neurological symptoms.1350-7540  2013 Wolters Kluwer Health | Lippincott Williams & WilkKEY CONCEPTS IN THE NEUROBIOLOGY
OF FUNCTIONAL MOVEMENT DISORDERS
Following from modern diagnostic criteria for
FMD, three key concepts emerge that must be
encompassed by any neurobiological model that
seeks to explain the disorder. The first relates to
attention. A key feature that distinguishes patients
with FMD from those with ‘organic’ movement
disorders is that the FMD requires attention to
manifest: when attention is distracted, there is typi-
cally a reduction, even disappearance of the move-
ment disorder [7]. Conversely, during examination,
movements are often performed with considerable
visual attention towards movement [10]. The sec-
ond key concept is symptom-related beliefs/expec-
tations. This does not just mean consciously
reportable beliefs about symptoms, but includes
expectations or ‘priors’ in the setting of active infer-
ence in the brain. Active inference refers to a well
grounded neurobiological theory of brain function
that the brain actively predicts and seeks to explain
sensory input on the basis of past experience: there
is an internal model of the world that is used to
interact with and explain the world [11]. The inter-
action between ‘bottom-up’ sensory information
and ‘top-down’ predictions about that information
is suggested to take place at multiple levels of an
interconnected hierarchy, and the end result of this
process is a percept or movement. Patients with
FMD can present symptoms that are incongruous
with basic neuroanatomical/neurophysiological
constraints of disease, but which, conceivably, fit
with reasonable lay beliefs about brain function. For
example, when the tremoring limb of patients with
functional tremor is restrained, tremor often spreads
to other body parts. This is something that defies
some basic principles of organic tremor generation.
An example of the same phenomenon outside FMD
is of tubular visual field defect in which patients
report a visual field defect that does not change in
size when the patient is examined close to them or
far away – something that defies the laws of optics.
In this way, FMD can be characterized as being
shaped by ‘high-level’ beliefs about symptoms.
The third key concept relates to agency. Agency
refers to a fundamental aspect of human self-con-
sciousness. We can make reportable judgements
about whether we did something (’I moved my
arm’ vs. ‘My arm was moved’) and in a more real-
world context, we possess a background subjective
sense of control over our actions – a sense of agency
[12]. The abnormal movements in FMD look like
movement that has been deliberately (i.e. with con-
scious fore-thought) produced by the patient
because attention is required for the movement to
manifest and the movement produced is notins www.co-neurology.com 443
Movement disorderscongruent with some basic neuroanatomical/phys-
iological constraints. Such movements would be
predicted to be associated with a strong sense of
agency. However, the self-report of patients is that
the movement is not under their control, and the
implication of this is that there is likely to be a
disruption of processes in patients with FMD that
would usually imbue such movements with a sense
of agency.
Below we review recent work in relation to
patients with FMD and these three key concepts
before discussing the recent attempts to construct
a neurobiological framework to explain FMD, and
by extension, other functional neurological symp-
toms.ATTENTION
Recent work has, in an experimental context,
probed the clinically well described phenomenon
in FMD of improvement in symptoms with distrac-
tion, and the converse worsening of symptoms and
even the production of completely new symptoms
when attention is drawn towards the body, typically
during physical examination. Paree´s et al. [13
&
]
looked at reaction and movement times in a group
of patients with FMD in different paradigms
designed to manipulate the degree of predictability
of the movement (and hence its capacity for pre-
planning). Performance on a ‘one-back’ task, in
which subjects had to move a cursor to a target seen
in a previous trial, was abnormal in FMD patients.
Performance was also abnormal in a precued choice
reaction time task in which the precue accurately
predicted the nature of the cue and hence themove-
ment that would be required. In both these tasks,
the nature of the movement required was highly
predicted and performance was impaired. However,
in an implicit motor learning task (learning of a
visuomotor transformation) and in a precued choice
reaction time task, when the precue was only par-
tially predictive or was not predictive of the cue,
performance of patients was normal. Importantly,
the degree of deficit in patients (e.g., a mean 40ms
slowing of reaction time to valid cues in the precued
reaction time task) ismuch less than that reported in
previous studies of malingered poor performance
[14]. Instead the implication is that when highly
predictedmovement is performed there is an oppor-
tunity for attention towards movement production.
This does not normally occur in healthy people [15]
but does in patients with FMD, and as a result, just as
when healthy people are explicitly instructed to pay
attention to movement [15], movement production
is impaired. This work fits with the previous find-
ing of impairment in movement in patients with444 www.co-neurology.comfunctional weakness when movement was primed
by a consciously perceived cue, compared with nor-
mal performance when movement was primed by a
cue that was not consciously perceived [16].
Complexity regarding the nature of attention
and FMD has been added by recent work that com-
pared positron emission tomography of regional
cerebral blood flow in a small cohort of patients
with ‘fixed’ functional dystonia and genetically
characterized primary dystonia as well as healthy
controls [17]. Both patient groups had abnormally
increased blood flow during movement in right
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Functional dystonia
patients had reduced blood flow in primary motor
cortex and increased blood flow in basal ganglia and
cerebellumwith an opposite pattern seen in patients
with genetic primary dystonia. The authors suggest
that although the prefrontal activation could
represent abnormal movement-related attention,
present in both dystonia groups, the abnormal sub-
cortical activations in functional patients could
reflect additional problems with self-directed atten-
tion/monitoring, perhaps related to frontosubcort-
ical circuits mediating motor attention, or even
reflecting a contribution from connected limbic
structures.BELIEFS
A recent study has explored an abstract probabilistic
reasoning task in patients with FMD [18
&
]. This
version of the ‘jumping to conclusions’ task presents
subjects with two jars full of coloured beads, one
with 80% blue and 20% red beads and the other with
80% red beads and 20% blue beads. The jars are
hidden and subjects are presented with a predeter-
mined sequence of beads and asked when they are
certain which jar the beads are being drawn from.
Patients with FMD made a judgement after signifi-
cantly fewer draws than controls, often after just one
or two beads had been displayed. The authors
hypothesized that such a reasoning style coupled
with sensory data occurring during a physical trig-
gering event might produce inappropriate updating
of expectations regarding future sensory data, for
example an expectation of pain, abnormal move-
ment or weakness, which might drive future
physical symptoms. The same style of rapid
decision-making on this task has previously been
reported in patients with delusional beliefs [19], for
example, in the context of schizophrenia. This work
makes a tentative but interesting parallel therefore
between the neurobiology of delusions [20] and
of FMD.
Expectations or prior beliefs play an important
role in altering sensory experience. This is, forVolume 26  Number 4  August 2013
Neurobiology of functional movement disorders Edwards et al.example, the basis of placebo effects. An important
effect of beliefs altering sensory experience has been
reported in patients with functional tremor. Patients
with functional and organic tremor were asked to
wear a wristwatch-like accelerometer, which con-
stantly recorded and stored data on tremor duration
over 5 days [21]. During this time, patients also
completed diaries rating howmuch of the time they
felt they had tremor. Both patient groups overesti-
mated the amount of time they had tremor, but
functional tremor patients did this to amuch greater
extent than patients with organic tremor. They had
on average 30min of tremor a day, but rated them-
selves affected by tremor 80–90% of the waking day.
This suggests a significant exaggeration of a natural
bias in tremor patients to overestimate tremor
duration. One hypothesis to explain this is that
there is a shift in the interaction between sensory
data from the tremoring limb and ‘top-down’ expec-
tations/predictions, so that with a very strong top-
down prediction of constant tremor in patients with
functional tremor, periods without tremor are
simply not perceived.AGENCY
When healthy subjects are asked to judge the timing
of a self-paced movement or of an auditory tone,
there is a difference in judgement depending on
whether the movement or tone occurs separately,
or if the movement is believed by the subject to
cause the tone to happen. In the latter context, the
perceived timings of the two events move closer to
each other (the movement is perceived to happen
later and the tone earlier) [22]. The net effect of this
perceptual distortion is to ‘bind’ the two events
together. This effect does not occur when the move-
ment is externally generated (for example by a trans-
cranial magnetic stimulus over the motor cortex
causing the finger to move), and it is hypothesised
that ‘action–effect temporal binding’ indexes sense
of agency for movement [22]. In a recent study,
this action–effect binding was explored with an
additional experimental manipulation in which
different pitches of tone were preconditioned with
pictures of faces with different emotional valence
(happy, neutral, sad) [23
&
]. There was no effect of
this preconditioning on performance, but overall
patients with FMD showed reduced action–effect
binding compared with healthy controls.
This work fits with a previous functional imag-
ing study in patients with functional tremor in
which activations related to habitual tremor were
compared with activations occurring when patients
deliberated mimicked their tremor [24]. There was
a significant hypoactivity found during habitual1350-7540  2013 Wolters Kluwer Health | Lippincott Williams & Wilktremor production in the right temporoparietal
junction. This area is hypothesized to be a key node
in the network underlying segregation of self-gener-
ated vs. externally generated sensation, and hence
also highly relevant to the process underlying sense
of agency. On the same theme, a previous study
employing a widely used (but also often criticised)
paradigm thought to assess aspects of sense of
agency – the Libet paradigm – found patients with
FMD to lack the normal period of subjective sense of
intention to move prior to a self-paced movement
compared with healthy controls [25].FROM CONCEPTS TO NEUROBIOLOGICAL
MODELS
The discussion above suggests three key concepts
that need to be integrated into any model that seeks
to explain the generation of FMD. In addition, one
would hope that any model could incorporate a role
for known precipitating factors and risk factors for
development of FMD, as well as being broad enough
to account for the known common co-occurrence of
different functional neurological symptoms in the
same patient.
Voon et al. [26], against the background of a
number of functional imaging and behavioural
studies in FMD [24,27
&&
,28], have proposed a model
for how FMD might be generated. The key concept
here is of a ‘previously mapped conversion motor
representation’, that is, a (conditioned) pattern of
movement established perhaps by a previous trig-
gering event. The commonly reported presence of
physical precipitating factors at onset such as injury
could provide a relevant trigger for development of a
‘conversion motor representation’. The additional
emotional arousal that is often reported in the back-
ground and/or at the time of onset could certainly
increase the salience of sensory information arising
during a physical trigger and facilitate this process.
Functional imaging studies from this group have
provided evidence for hypoactivity in areas usually
associated with action selection [e.g., supple-
mentary motor area (SMA)], as well as abnormally
strong connectivity between limbic structures (e.g.,
amygdala) and SMA [26,28]. The proposal is that in
an arousing context, the previously mapped con-
version motor representation is activated in part
because of the abnormal functional connectivity
between limbic structures and SMA, and cannot
be inhibited because there is a disconnection
between SMA and areas (prefrontal cortex for
example) that could usually inhibit unwanted
action. The result is a movement that arises without
a normal prediction of its sensory consequences
(efference copy) and is therefore (mis)interpretedins www.co-neurology.com 445
Movement disordersby patients as without agency and therefore not self-
generated [26].
Edwards et al. [29
&&
] have proposed a model that
employs Bayesian theories of brain function (active
inference) to explain functional sensory and motor
symptoms, including FMD. This model relies on the
instigation of an abnormal ‘prior’ or expectation,
proposed to reside in an intermediate level of the
cortical hierarchy such as SMA (for those withmotor
symptoms). It is suggested that a variety of factors
could be relevant to the formation of this abnormal
prior, likely to be different for different patients,
including physical precipitants that provide novel
sensory data about the self, panic responses at the
time of symptom onset, affective disorders, personal
and cultural illness beliefs, and decision-making
styles such as those found in the ‘jumping to con-
clusions’ task. The proposal is that self-directed
attention would, via increasing the precision
(weight) applied to the prior over relevant ‘bot-
tom-up’ sensory data, cause movement or percepts
in keeping with the prior. Importantly, as higher
cortical regions (for example prefrontal regions)
mediating self-directed attention carry no predic-
tion about the content of the prior, the resulting
movement or percept is experienced as an unwilled
phenomenon, which is then quite rationally attrib-
uted by the patient as a symptom.CONCLUSION
There are clear areas of overlap between these
models, and indeed with previous models, for
example, Brown’s cognitive model [30] of medi-
cally unexplained symptoms in which he proposes
a role for ‘rogue representations’, and indeed
going back as far as Russell Reynolds’ proposal
in the mid 19th century that beliefs about symp-
toms can involuntarily alter movement or per-
ception [31]. The advancement of recent models
is to place FMD within a testable, biologically
plausible framework. This framework still includes
an important potential role for the ‘presumed
psychological factors’ discussed at the beginning
of this review, but also allows considerable flexi-
bility in the manner in which symptoms might
be triggered in individual patients. This shift in
emphasis has relevance for diagnostic expla-
nations for patients [32] and treatment develop-
ment, and it is hoped will eventually improve the
provision of appropriate care and long-term prog-
nosis for patients with FMD and other functional
neurological symptoms.
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